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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Military Commissions
Joshua L. Dratel

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

The Guantánamo Bay military commissions have generated controversy since their inception. Fundamental threshold issues that are
never considered in traditional court systems—such as whether defense lawyers could participate in any manner consistent with ethical
obligations—arose with regularity in an invented, hybrid, ad hoc apparatus that contained just enough process to provide a patina of
fairness, but that was designed and operated to ensure convictions.
That reality can, of course, be discouraging to lawyers aiming to
litigate on behalf of clients in ordinary circumstances. In the Guantánamo Bay military commissions, though, the problems were aggravated by several factors, including (a) the client’s general distrust of
the United States; (b) the treatment (more often maltreatment) of
the client at the hands of the United States prior to commencement
of the attorney-client relationship; (c) the client’s lengthy isolation at
Guantánamo Bay; (d) the lack of applicability of any particular body
of law, whether U.S. federal, U.S. military, the laws of armed conflict
(LOAC), including the Geneva Convention, international law, or in1
ternational humanitarian law (IHL); (f) the geographic and logistical remoteness of Guantánamo Bay; and (g) the continued politicization of even the most mundane aspect of detainee affairs and of the
conduct of the military commissions.
∗
President of Dratel & Mysliwiec, P.C., in New York City. B.A., Columbia College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1
See, e.g., Danielle Keats & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1486 (2011) (“[T]he Department of Defense located many detainees in the War on Terror at Guantánamo Bay, which it
viewed as a legal ‘no man’s land’ where neither American law nor any other country’s law was supposed to apply.”); Michael J.D. Sweeney, Detention at Guantánamo Bay:
A Linguistic Challenge to Law, 30 HUM. RTS. 15, 15 (2003)(“[T]he Bush administration
has refused to recognize the detainees under international law and has avoided the
legal obligations.”).
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Notwithstanding those challenges, it would be a mistake to consider the experienced criminal defense practitioner at a complete
disadvantage when practicing in these military commissions. Indeed,
as the first U.S. civilian attorney to visit a client detainee at Guantánamo Bay—David Hicks, in early January 2004—and as David’s civilian defense counsel in the first, second, and third iterations of the
Guantánamo Bay military commissions, my thirty years as a criminal
defense attorney practicing in the federal and state courts in the
United States afforded me several important advantages in those proceedings.
As detailed below, those advantages can be categorized broadly
as follows:
(a) the advantage of being the first private defense lawyer in2
volved in the military commissions;
(b) the advantage of experience litigating in a properly constituted, legitimate criminal court system (i.e., the U.S. federal system
3
operating in Article III courts);
(c) the advantage of being a criminal defense lawyer in the military commission system with the rights, albeit limited, attendant to
the criminal process therein, rather than as a civil plaintiff’s lawyer in
the habeas corpus context, which provided the detention authorities
4
substantially more control over attorney-client relations and conduct;
(d) the advantage of familiarity with the rules and procedures
governing the use of classified information and evidence in the fed5
eral courts;
(e) the advantage of experience litigating—including investigation, preparation, and trial—complex, document-intensive, multi2

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III. Such courts are denominated “Article III” courts
because their authority derives from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. III, §§ 1, 2. Judges in such courts are appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. Id. art. II, § 2. They possess lifetime tenure. Id. art. III, § 1. District
court judges preside at the trial level.
District Courts, U. S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictC
ourts.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). Circuit court of appeals judges are at the intermediate
appellate
level.
Courts
of
Appeals,
U.
S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofA
ppeals.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). The United States Supreme Court constitutes the ultimate legal authority, and its opinions are binding on all federal and
state judicial systems. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (3d ed. 1996). In addition,
the criminal justice system under Article III courts is based on constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules, and not on the common law.
4
See discussion infra Part IV.
5
See discussion infra Part V.
3
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defendant cases, which are exceedingly rare in the ordinary military
6
court-martial system;
(f) the advantage of adopting a client-oriented, rather than
cause-oriented, approach that is second nature for criminal defense
7
attorneys in the U.S.; and
(g) the advantage of having a global audience paying extraordinary attention to the proceedings at the Guantánamo Bay military
commissions, thereby providing an alternate and continuing source
8
of pressure on the government.
Each and all of these advantages provided civilian defense counsel at least some openings to perform their craft in a manner capable
of leveling, at least partially (and to the greatest extent possible), the
military commissions’ playing field that was so deliberately tilted in
favor of the prosecution.
II. THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING FIRST
When I agreed to represent David Hicks in December 2003, the
government was eager to facilitate my involvement and my ability to
visit David at Guantánamo Bay. The rumor was that the government
expected David to cooperate with the prosecution, to enter a plea of
guilty, and to assist with other investigations and prosecutions. David
would have made a perfect prosecution witness in some respects—an
English-speaking native Westerner, an Australian who was not responsible for any violent conduct or terrorist activity—and thereby
provided the nascent military commission system with some legitimacy.
That incentive for the government provided me with more leverage than I might have possessed otherwise. The initial hurdles were
9
the terms of my formal entry as David’s civilian counsel. The military
commission process, which at the time was essentially devoid of for-

6

See discussion infra Part VI.
See discussion infra Part VII.
8
See discussion infra Part VIII.
9
David already had detailed—the military’s term for having been assigned—
military counsel (USMC), Major Michael D. Mori and an Australian Foreign Attorney
Consultant (FAC), Steven Kenney, both of whom had already visited David once at
Guantánamo Bay prior to my engagement as David’s U.S. civilian defense lawyer.
Joseph Margulies, Esq., one of the architects of the entire Guantánamo Bay habeas strategy, had represented David, who was a plaintiff in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004). However, it was determined that Mr. Margulies could not represent David in the military commissions due to his multiple representation of detainees in Rasul. As a result, I was asked to be David’s civilian defense counsel.
7

DRATEL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1342

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/16/2011 2:39 PM

[Vol. 41:1339

mal rules or procedures, did, however, have protocols for defense
10
counsel’s admission into the military commission system.
A. The Proposed Conditions for Civilian Defense Counsel Participation
The principal document was called “Annex B,” which set forth
the terms and conditions of representation and required counsel’s
11
sworn agreement to abide by those terms and conditions. In its ini12
tial form, however, Annex B was unacceptable. In August 2003, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) approved Ethics Opinion 03-04 issued by its Ethics Advisory Commit13
tee. The opinion adopted the position that “it is unethical for a
criminal defense lawyer to represent a person accused before these
military commissions because the conditions imposed upon defense
counsel before these commissions make it impossible for counsel to
14
provide adequate or ethical representation.”
The NACDL opinion added that “[d]efense counsel cannot contract away his or her client’s rights, including the right to zealous advocacy, before a military commission, which is what the government
seeks in Annex B, although it says it is not, in spite of the clear lan15
guage of the MCI’s.” The NACDL opinion did “not condemn criminal defense lawyers who undertake to represent persons accused before military commissions because some may feel an obligation to do
16
so.” However, the opinion did impose upon such lawyers an obligation
to raise, with knowledge of the serious and unconscionable risks
involved in violating Annex B, including possible indictment,
every conceivable good faith argument concerning the jurisdiction of the military commission, the legality of denial of applica10
See Dep’t of Def., Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of Civilian Def. Counsel, Annex B (2003) [hereinafter Annex B 2003], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2006/d20060217MCI5.pdf.
11
Id.
12
NACDL Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-04, at 1 (2003) [hereinafter NACDL
Opinion],
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/search.aspx?term=nacdl%20ethics%20advisory%20committee
%20opinion.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. A “MCI” was a Military Commission Instruction in the initial Guantánamo
commissions system in 2004. MCI’s were designed to provide guidance to practitioners in the commission system. See, e.g., Dep’t of Def., Military Comm’n Instruction
No.
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/may2003/d20030430milcominstno1.pdf.
16
NACDL Opinion, supra note 12, at 1.
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tion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), international treaties, and due process of law, including resort to the civilian courts of the United States to determine whether the pro17
ceedings are constitutional.

The NACDL opinion identified several provisions of Annex B
and the Military Commission Instructions, which it incorporated, that
were objectionable, including:
(1)the requirement that civilian defense counsel acknowledge
18
and agree to monitoring of attorney-client communications;
(2)the requirement that civilian defense counsel acknowledge
and agree to be barred from certain proceedings, despite having the
19
requisite security clearance;
(3)the requirement that civilian defense counsel “ensure the
commission proceedings are counsel’s primary duty and no matter in
counsel’s private practice or personal life can interfere with the
20
commission’s proceedings”; and
(4)the requirement that “once proceedings have begun, [civilian
defense] counsel will not leave the site of the proceedings without
21
approval of the Appointing Authority or Presiding Officer.”
In addition, Annex B also unreasonably limited the scope of the
defense team and the ability of defense counsel to share information
22
with appropriate consultants, experts, and witnesses. As the NACDL
opinion protested, the individual and cumulative effect of these provisions was that “full zealous representation likely will not and cannot
be achieved because of severe and unreasonable limits on counsel
imposed by the government, in violation of the UCMJ and treaties
the United States has signed guaranteeing rights to the accused be23
fore these commissions.”
As a result, the NACDL opinion concluded that “[c]riminal defense lawyers are severely disadvantaged in
their duties to represent their clients,” and that “[t]he loss of rights
24
can only help insure unjust and unreliable convictions.”
The NACDL opinion, however, constituted a powerful statement
of an attorney’s duty in the military commissions, and a basis for refusing to sign Annex B as initially presented. That unwavering insti17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.(citation omitted).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
See Annex B 2003, supra 10, at II(C); NACDL Opinion, supra note 12, at 23.
NACDL Opinion, supra note 12, at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
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tutional support for civilian defense counsel, coupled with the government’s desire to get the commission process under way (and to
facilitate David’s anticipated cooperation), provided me with substantial leverage to resist those intolerable conditions.
In addition, the fact that no one else had yet agreed to those
terms—as I was the first civilian defense counsel to visit Guantánamo,
and therefore to confront Annex B in practice—provided me with a
clean slate that enhanced that leverage. Insisting on adherence to
the NACDL opinion, I informed military commission officials that I
would not sign Annex B unless it was modified to meet the NACDL
opinion’s objections.
In response, commission officials obliged by eliminating or
amending the offending sections. Consequently, the monitoring
provision was removed entirely, and the other unpalatable terms were
revised to reflect federal court standards (i.e., slavish devotion to the
commissions at the expense of all other professional and personal
engagements was no longer required, and the contours of the defense team were the same as those in federal court, as were the stan25
dards for adjournments of proceedings). In addition, as in federal
court, the amended Annex B permitted civilian defense counsel to
26
object to any ex parte proceedings.
After commission officials prepared that version of Annex B, and
I executed it, I was officially David’s civilian defense counsel in the
military commissions. By April 2004, Annex B had been revised to re27
flect all of those changes. As a result, all subsequent civilian defense
lawyers in the commissions were spared the most onerous provisions
of Annex B that the NACDL opinion had identified.
B. The Flexibility of Operating in a System Prior to Promulgation of
Rules
Being involved in the military commissions and interacting with
the Guantánamo Bay detention operation prior to any other civilian
counsel provided flexibility in a system for which rules had not yet
been formulated, much less implemented. The absence of rules allowed us to gain improvements in David’s conditions at Guantánamo
that were not possible once formal procedures were set in place,
25
Compare Dep’t of Def., Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of
Civilian Def. Counsel, Annex B (2004) [hereinafter Annex B 2004], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2004/d20040206milcominstno5annB.pdf,
with
Annex B 2003, supra note 10.
26
Annex B 2004, supra note 25, at II.E.1.ing to, please provide the proper
27
See Annex B 2004, supra note 25.
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which occurred once a regular stream of lawyers began visiting the
base. We also enjoyed greater freedom of movement and less interference with materials we sought to review and leave with David. During that early period we were able, in many respects, to capitalize on
the rules vacuum and correspondingly customize David’s conditions
for his benefit.
Part of our success in gaining improvements was attributable to
the military officials directly in charge of lawyer access and legal issues, who were accessible and in most cases agreeable. Also, when
Major General Jay Hood assumed command of the detention opera28
tion early in 2004, he afforded us personal access to him and his
staff to lodge complaints or raise issues. Military personnel, however,
were regularly rotated from assignment at Guantánamo Bay. Successive military officers were progressively less interested in accommodating counsel or facilitating their relationships with their clients and
more interested in creating bureaucratic obstacles that did not exist
at the outset.
III. EXPERIENCE LITIGATING IN A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED,
LEGITIMATE CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM
Anyone experienced in litigating in federal court would instantly
note its contrast with the Guantánamo military commissions, especial29
ly back in 2004. As a threshold matter, presence of military defense

28
Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Drops Post in Pakistan for Top General, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2008, at A1.
29
Two sets of hearings were conducted in 2004. At the first, in August 2004, four
defendants, including David, were arraigned on the charges against them. U.S. Prepares for Guantánamo Arraignments, USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2004),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-23-gitmo-trial_x.htm.
At the
second, in October 2004, certain pretrial motions were argued, and voir dire of the
commission members commenced. See Dep’t of Def., Challenges for Cause Decision
No. 2004-001, at 1 (2004) [hereinafter Challenges for Cause Decision], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2004/d20041021panel.pdf;
ANGUS
MARTYN,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., PROGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSION TRIAL
OF DAVID HICKS 1 (2005), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/200405/05rn33.pdf. Illustrating the lack of administrative planning that regularly afflicted the commissions, two members of the panel that heard those motions were
subsequently disqualified by the Appointing Authority on defense’s motion based on
their voir dire answers. Id. Also, on the second day of the October 2004 proceedings, a federal judge invalidated the commissions in part, and issued a restraining
order enjoining the proceedings. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173–74
(D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (“[U]nless and until the rules for Military Commissions . . . are amended . . .
petitioner may not be tried by Military Commission . . . .”). The commission proceedings against David did not formally resume until months after the Supreme
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counsel made importation of certain military justice conventions
(e.g., scripted, formalistic pretrial conferences, extensive off-the30
record contact between the parties and the “court”) relatively painless. The military commissions’ lack of structure, however, and the
chaos that ensued at every proceeding, was glaring in comparison
with federal court practice.
For example, the first time a defendant asked to proceed pro se
(and thus represent himself), which occurred during the first day of
commission hearings, the proceedings came to a screeching and ab31
rupt halt. Similarly, the unprecedented composition of the commis32
sion—its members, predominantly non-lawyers, were all equals, deciding all issues of fact and law—was completely unworkable. The
four non-lawyers on David’s prospective commission—the fifth member was a retired military judge re-activated specifically for assignment
33
to the commissions —simply lacked the capacity to analyze or decide
legal issues in any coherent, consistent, or competent fashion. Untrained in the law and with very limited exposure to court-martial
proceedings, they could not grasp fundamental legal concepts such
as jurisdiction (or more accurately, its limits), ex post facto, the dangers of hearsay, and/or the relevance of expert testimony, which they
rejected altogether when offered by the defense.
Problems also arose with respect to the scope of voir dire, in34
cluding whether certain portions should be classified, as well as with
the quality of translators, the confidentiality of defense counsel’s inCourt’s 2006 decision in Hamdan and the subsequent passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
30
The initial commission proceedings did not designate a “judge,” as all panel
members acted as both judge and jury on all issues—factual, legal, and evidentiary.
Bruce Zagaris, Controversy Over U.S. Guantánamo Detentions Continues, 20 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT LAW REP. 12, 12 (2004). One panel member, however, was a retired
military judge brought back to active duty for service in the military commissions,
and he served as the “judge” for purposes of organizing the proceedings and communicating with counsel for both parties. Scott L. Silliman, On Military Commissions,
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529, 537 n.50 (2005).
31
See Challenges for Cause Decision, supra note 29, at 1 n.1. See generally MARK P.
DENBEAUX ET AL., THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 185
(2009) (discussing how “ill prepared” the government was to deal with a pro se detainee).
32
Toni Locy, Guantánamo Hearings Start Today, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at 4A
(noting that, from the panel members, only retired Army Colonel Peter Brownback
had legal training).
33
See Silliman, supra note 30, at 537 n.50.
34
Ultimately, it was the general consensus of all involved that significant portions
(if not all) of the voir dire that were conducted in classified session should have been
held in open court, while other responses from prospective panel members made in
open court perhaps should have been classified.
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court communications with the client given the proximity of military
court security, and the lack of availability of interpreters for such
35
purposes. Substantive and procedural defects continued to plague
the military commissions, creating a stark distinction from the mundane and inexorable progress of a federal criminal case of even the
greatest magnitude.
The nearly wholly uncharted proceedings that the commissions
represented in 2004 (and for most purposes, through the middle of
2006, until passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the
promulgation and implementation of a formal set of more compre36
hensive rules and procedures) offered experienced federal court
practitioners three distinct advantages: (1) each particular deviation
from federal court practice could be cited as a material deficiency in
the commission system, (2) the standards and practices employed in
federal court could be cited as preferable in those many instances in
which the military commission rules and orders had failed to provide
any guidance, and (3) when appropriate, the lack of any military
commission rules or standards served as an opportunity to craft innovative challenges or solutions that were based on and consistent with
federal court practice.
Federal practice standards were, of course, particularly useful
with respect to distinguishing the critical fundamentals of the commissions from those present in the federal system. Such standards included (a) the composition of the commission (non-lawyers endowed
with the responsibility for making legal determinations), (b) the preference for hearsay over direct testimony, (c) the problems with the
substantive offenses (notably regarding jurisdiction and the ex post
facto doctrine), and (d) the diminution of the defendant’s right to
confront evidence.
In addition, federal practice standards also contrasted with the
commission in the context of Sixth Amendment standards regarding
attorney-client confidentiality and the scope of the attorney-client
privilege and access, the sequence of pretrial events (e.g., bifurcating
35
For example, during the initial proceedings, private interpreters (hired by the
defense teams) sitting in the audience immediately challenged the accuracy of translations by the court interpreters. Also, due to the small size of the courtroom, and
the manner in which it had been reconfigured to accommodate the commissions,
security personnel were situated so close to the defense table that it was very difficult
to have even a whispered conversation with the defendant without the danger of it
being overheard. For those defendants who did not speak English, adding a third
person—the interpreter—to the conversation made confidentiality impossible.
36
Pub. L. No 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.).
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discovery motions from motions attacking the charging instrument
from motions regarding evidentiary challenges), the range of resources made available by the courts for the defense of indigent de37
fendants, and the handling of classified information. Moreover, the
initial military commissions’ lack of rules and standards left so much
uncovered that federal practice and military practice under the
38
UCMJ served as the most likely and applicable analog. When, however, the attempt to import the methodology of those established systems into the military commissions was opposed by the prosecution
and/or rejected by the military commission itself, it merely illuminated the fatal flaws in the commissions system, including its resistance to fairness in adjudicating the detainees’ cases.
Ultimately there were too many such instances to catalogue
completely; they accumulated on a continuing basis and severely undercut the commissions’ claim to any legitimacy. The repeated references to federal practice and its superiority to the military commissions substantively and procedurally (and in the context of orderly,
predictable, reliable, and consistent proceedings and results) provided an invaluable template for challenging both the essence and
operations of the commissions. Experienced civilian practitioners,
equipped with the depth of experience and who could with the utmost confidence point to and explain examples from federal court
practice, were able to expose the inadequacies of the military commissions on a regular basis.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING A LAWYER IN THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS SYSTEM RATHER THAN IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
Since military commission prosecutions commenced in early
2004, which was before any lawyers representing detainees in habeas
corpus proceedings were permitted to visit their clients at Guantá39
namo Bay, certain standards for military commission attorney access
and conduct were already in place before the rules for habeas lawyers
were formulated. That prior access became a distinct advantage for
lawyers operating in the military commissions who were subject to dif-

37

See discussion infra Part V. Traditional military justice under the UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2006), also provided ample sources for comparison with the military commissions, with the latter proving inadequate in nearly every respect.
38
Id.
39
See Biography of Gitanjali Gutierrez, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS.,
http://ccrjustice.org/about-us/staff-board/gutierrez,-gitanjali (last visited Sept. 16,
2011).
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ferent rules, different treatment, and different recognition than the
habeas lawyers.
The criminal nature of the military commissions provided a
strong basis for insisting on the charged detainees’ rights to counsel,
the full protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege, and the
protection of attorney work product. Also, because the military
commissions’ charges and the detailing of military defense counsel
40
were referred before any habeas lawyers were allowed to visit their
clients at Guantánamo Bay, defense counsel in the commissions were
able to operate under the auspices of a criminal prosecution before
any of the more restrictive provisions applying to habeas lawyers were
imposed.
Consequently, many of the restrictions under which habeas
counsel were compelled to conduct their representation never applied to commissions’ defense counsel. For example, during my representation of David (1) none of his statements to counsel were
considered classified or embargoed in any way (other than initially
with respect to the physical aspects of his confinement, but this restriction, too, vanished within a couple of months), (2) none of what
he wrote was subject to any such restrictions, (3) there was no protective order with respect to communications or relations with the client
(but rather only with respect to discovery provided by the prosecution), (4) none of the materials we provided or received from David
were subject to any “privilege team” review, and (5) we were not subject to any formal limitations with respect to access to the client when
we wished to visit. Conversely, the habeas attorneys suffered under all
41
of those constraints.
Even logistically there were benefits. Civilian lawyers (and of
course their military co-counsel) in the military commissions were
permitted to reside on the “windward” side of the base, situated on
the eastern side of Guantánamo Bay. The windward side contained
more resources and reduced travel time—including elimination of
the ferry ride each morning and evening to the “leeward” side and
back—to and from the detention camps, which were also located on
the windward side. Nor were civilian defense lawyers in the commissions assigned personnel to accompany them everywhere. Rather,
Guantánamo base officials deemed military defense counsel suitable
40

“Referral” is simply the technical term for the process by which military
charges are instituted against a defendant.
41
See, e.g., Josh White, Rules for Lawyers of Detainees Are Called Onerous, WASH. POST,
Feb. 13, 2008, at A3 (“All mail from the lawyers to the detainees and from the detainees to their attorneys is screened by a Defense Department Privilege Team . . . .”).
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escorts. Civilian defense lawyers in the commissions shared offices in
the first commissions building with their military counterparts, which
included access to telephones and the Internet. These working conditions enabled civilian defense lawyers in the commissions to use
their time more productively and efficiently when not visiting clients
at the detention camps.
The more favorable conditions under which civilian defense lawyers in the military commissions operated without any incident demonstrates that the disparate treatment of habeas counsel was purely
arbitrary, unnecessary, and designed simply to impair the effectiveness of those attorneys and their relationships with their detainee
clients. Unfortunately, as the revived commissions move forward, the
Department of Defense (DoD), via its proposed protective order and
directive to the military lawyers announcing DoD’s position that it
can monitor all electronic and telephonic communications to and
42
from the Office of Military Defense Counsel-Defense (OMC-D), is
attempting to engraft the more restrictive treatment of lawyers in the
civil habeas cases on to the defense attorneys in the military commissions. The purpose of such gratuitous rules, which are neither necessary for national security nor for case management in the commissions themselves, is transparent: to constrict and impair the defense
43
function in the commissions.
V. THE ADVANTAGES OF FAMILIARITY WITH CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE
PROCEDURES AND RULES
The commissions initially lacked any formal or practical protocols for handling classified information and evidence. As a result,
expertise in litigating under the Classified Information Procedures
42

See Dep’t of Def., Protective Order & Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees Subject to Military Commission Prosecution at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo
Bay,
Cuba
(2011),
available
at
http://www.talkleft.com/legal/militcommprotorder.pdf; Memorandum from Col.
Jeffrey Colwell, Chief Mil. Def. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., on Objections to Protective Order and Procedure for Counsel Access of Mar. 4, 2011 (Mar. 15, 2011), available
at
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2011/03/19/14/CDC_PO_objections_15_
Mar_11.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf.
43
It likely also represents the Obama administration seeking to mollify congressional critics who, in 2010, passed an amendment (that failed in the Senate) requiring DoD to investigate any lawyer who represented a Guantánamo Bay detainee and,
inter alia, about whom there existed “reasonable suspicion” of having “interfered with
the operations of the Department of Defense.” Letter from Former Prosecutors and
Judges to Senate Armed Servs. Comm. 1 (June 18, 2010), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/408.pdf. See also H.R. REP. NO. 111-491, at
367 (2011).
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44

Act (CIPA), the statute that governs classified material and evidence
in federal criminal prosecutions, was invaluable.
Knowledge not only of CIPA’s procedural framework but also of
the unblemished history of defense attorneys’ compliance with the
confidentiality of classified information provided a firm and principled basis for successfully resisting any restrictions on access or use
of classified material that extended beyond what was permitted in the
federal courts. In addition, CIPA provided a template for offering
common sense and reliable solutions that was absent from the military commission rules. As a result, defense counsel were able to operate with confidence that—in the absence of commission rules on
the subject—the manner in which we treated classified information
and evidence was consistent with the law, conventional practice endorsed by the federal courts, and national security. Experience in litigating cases involving classified information and evidence also aided
civilian defense counsel with respect to proposed protective orders.
45
Federal cases implicating classified information always include pro46
tective orders. To the extent the military commissions attempted to
impose conditions in protective orders that were more stringent on
defense counsel and defense preparation, we were able to point to
the protective orders in federal cases—as well as the perfect record of
protecting such information in federal court—as examples of adequately protected classified information that did not unduly constrain
defense preparation and investigation.
VI. THE ADVANTAGES OF EXPERIENCE IN INVESTIGATING, PREPARING,
AND LITIGATING COMPLEX, DOCUMENT-INTENSIVE, MULTI-DEFENDANT
CASES
Criminal prosecutions in the military justice system rarely involve
more than one defendant, and among those, even rarer are complex,
document-intensive cases—and by that term I mean a volume in the
thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands, of pages. Yet such
prosecutions are commonplace in the federal courts, and in a variety
of cases, including white-collar crime, terrorism, computer fraud, and

44

18 U.S.C. App. III, §§ 1–16 (2006).
CIPA makes such protective orders mandatory upon government motion. Id. §
3. As a result, such motions are entered in every case involving classified information.
46
See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2010); Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“At no time . . . may Petitioner’s
Counsel make any public or private statements disclosing any classified information
made available pursuant to this Protective Order.”).
45
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47

identity theft. In addition, organized crime and gang cases, as well
as terrorism cases, routinely involve extensive forensic evidence and
48
expert testimony. Again, such cases are infrequent in the military
justice system.
Such cases are different in kind and degree not only because of
the amount of discovery. In addition, the scope of the necessary defense investigation (involving not simply an act or discrete series of
acts, but a transnational conspiracy over considerable time designed
to achieve multiple criminal objectives and to commit manifold diverse offenses in the process), the preparation time required for trial
readiness, the use of broad inchoate offenses (e.g., conspiracy and
“material support” for terrorism), and the intricate legal issues that
arise in the context of complex offenses and fact patterns, distinguish
such cases from the ordinary prosecution. These intricacies can also
alter the dynamics among co-defendants and their counsel. Many
lawyers, even in the federal courts, are unfamiliar with joint defense
agreements, joint strategy sessions, and harmonization of codefendants’ approaches to the case in a manner that denies the prosecution use of its traditional “divide and conquer” blueprint.
Multi-defendant cases present a minefield of opportunities for
conflict among co-defendants and their tactical and strategic choices.
While it is often challenging to reconcile contrasting interests among
defendants—and their counsel’s theory of their defense—it is only in
the rarest of instances that one defendant cannot achieve his strategic
objective or engage in specific tactics without also fashioning it in a
manner that avoids harming a co-defendant. Nor is this simply altruism; the benefits are reciprocal, as advance consideration of how a
particular argument, exhibit, or cross-examination will affect a codefendant’s case is the best insurance against the opposite happening
to your client. Such consideration is contagious and encourages other counsel to preview parts of their case that might be harmful to
other defendants.
The key is communication among counsel and with the defendants both individually and as a group. A defense that is not cohesive
and involves counsel who, through either obliviousness, carelessness,

47

See, e.g., United States v. White, No. 06-377-1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60778, at
*18 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2007) (“This case involves ten defendants and twenty-two
counts . . . and aggravated identity theft. The indictment describes seventy-five different transactions . . . . Discovery included thousands of documents . . . .”).
48
See, e.g., United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr. 673, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34372
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (involving expert testimony for charges pertaining to material support to a foreign terrorist organization).
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or worse, disparage other defendants more often than not inures to
the detriment of all defendants in a multi-defendant trial, including
the attorneys who engage in such tactics. In fact, it is one of the chief
ancillary advantages enjoyed by the prosecution in a multi-defendant
case.
Yet regular and continued communication among counsel can
diminish the negative effects in such cases. For example, legal issues
advanced by one defendant can have a significantly better chance of
success than if presented by another defendant (because either the
factual context or some other aspect favors one defendant over
another). Also, the timing in which issues are raised can also be critical and can benefit from joint discussion so that the benefits are maximized for all defendants.
Language of argument or crossexamination can be structured so that it accomplishes its goal but
minimizes or eliminates altogether the harm to another defendant.
Cross-examination can also be divided not only to share ideas and to
reduce each counsel’s workload, but also to allocate to each counsel
areas of cross-examination that most benefit their client (and, in
turn, transfer to other counsel areas that are of use to them or which
would benefit the client more if aired by a different defendant). As a
cooperative venture, a whole defense in a multi-defendant case is far
greater than the sum of its parts.
None of that is possible, however, if counsel fail or are unwilling
to communicate. Experience in these types of cases—whether in securities or other white-collar cases, organized crime racketeering
prosecutions, or large-scale drug cases—is sobering, as both exemplary and awful examples at each extreme provide the best lessons for
future practice and sear into memory the consequences of a balkanized defense and the geometric advantages of striving to find strategic and tactical common ground.
Yet military counsel were almost all completely unexposed to
such cases and to the culture of a joint defense. Also, while the first
four commissions cases back in 2004 were charged as single49
defendant cases, it was clear that they would proceed in many respects as a multi-defendant case. The only judicial officer on each
commission was the same, and the cases were heard in series over
50
consecutive days. Thus, whichever case went first would set the tone
in many respects for the cases that followed. As a result, knowing
49

See Challenges for Cause Decision, supra note 29.
See John Mintz, Presiding Officer at Guantánamo Faces Questions, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A3 (noting that the was Army Colonel Peter E. Brownback III presided over all four cases).
50
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which issues might be important to the next defendant, even if not
integral to the client’s case, would influence how a particular issue
might be presented in order not to minimize the importance of that
other issue, which is vital to the co-defendant. Also, again, if a particular defendant’s circumstances strengthened his chances on a certain
issue, it would be prudent for counsel to recognize that that defendant’s counsel should be afforded the opportunity to emphasize that
51
issue.
Obviously, these are not matters taught in law school—even in
clinical programs, which correctly concentrate on developing individual lawyering skills. Nor are these matters recognized or cultivated
in a system that handles almost exclusively single-defendant cases
charged with individual offenses narrowly defined in time and scope.
Such matters are second nature, though, to lawyers with extensive
52
experience in federal court practice.
VII. THE ADVANTAGES OF A CLIENT-ORIENTED, RATHER THAN
CAUSE-ORIENTED, APPROACH
A criminal defense attorney’s horizon is usually limited to one
client’s objectives in a particular case. That, after all, is the mandate:
zealous, un-conflicted representation of the client—in the singular,
and not the plural. Yet in the context of Guantánamo Bay, the
“cause” could also serve as a distraction, as the inclination to view the
detainees—their identities hidden for so long and their individuality
denied as a consequence—as a unitary entity was powerful. Add to
that dynamic the multiple representation of detainees in the habeas
cases, and as a result, the obligation to the specific client could easily
be obscured.
Also, the commentary regarding Guantánamo Bay, whether in
the media, or from academics, politicians, or legal and human rights
51
A corresponding advantage in the military commissions was that it was unclear
whether the military prosecutors’ experience was broader than their military defense
counterparts’. As a result, those prosecutors did not exploit the multi-defendant
context nearly as often or effectively as civilian prosecutors. For example, the initial
cases were charged individually even though the defendants were charged with what
a civilian prosecutor would recognize as the same conspiracy and would consequently present in the same indictment charging multiple defendants.
52
Conversely, the diverse nature of a federal practice afforded civilian defense
counsel ample preparation for learning unfamiliar areas of law such as the Laws of
Armed Conflict, the Geneva Convention, international humanitarian law, and the
procedural and substantive elements of the UCMJ. Absorbing those doctrines simply
replicated what occurs in the course of federal practice, which requires criminal defense counsel to master, over time and in considerable detail, securities law, tax law,
construction law, banking law, and other areas of law that arise in particular cases.
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organizations, invariably treated the detainees’ circumstances en
53
masse—as a unitary legal or human rights issue —even though detainees often faced individual problems and possessed different interests and priorities. That grouping of the detainees, facilitated by
54
the U.S. government’s refusal to identify the detainees (and its earlier tactical decision not to confine any U.S. citizens at Guantánamo
55
Bay, thereby effectively eliminating the U.S. public at large as an interested party), made it convenient, even seductive, to transfer that
more abstract approach to the representation of individual detainees
in their criminal military commissions prosecutions.
Again, though, the culture of criminal defense lawyering in the
U.S. criminal justice system acted as a bulwark against that division of
interest. While in civil litigation multiple representation is permitted,
and is often efficient if the interests of the clients converge, the general rule is the opposite in the U.S. federal criminal justice system:
56
one client per lawyer. That limitation guards against viewing too
broadly the attorney’s role and duty, which is to the individual client
57
only. Having more than one client per lawyer was a persistent issue
regarding representation in the military commissions as the detainees, and the commissions themselves, were the subject of an ongoing political debate that often transcended individual cases and the
important issues at stake for each detainee defendant. Although it
may have been tempting to treat the conditions at Guantánamo Bay
and the structure of the military commissions as grounds for a
“cause” on the detainees’ behalf, in the context of a criminal prosecution, that would be as misguided as it would be contrary to ethical
obligations. Treating the two as grounds for a cause would have jeo-

53
See, e.g., E.A. Torriero, Guantánamo Braces for Change, CHI. TRIBUNE, July 12,
2004, at 1 (noting human rights groups’ criticism).
54
See President Makes Recess Selections, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Pa.), Jan. 5,
2006, at A-8 (discussing media efforts to uncover the identities of the detainees)
55
See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, The Questions the Court Will Consider, USA TODAY, Apr.
19, 2004, at 13A (noting that a U.S. citizen “was transferred to a military brig in the
USA when officials realized” this fact).
56
See, e.g., United States v. Curcio, 786 F.2d 52 (1986) (discussing dangers arising
from multiple representation); Rory K. Little, A Roundtable Discussion of the ABA’s
Standards for Criminal Litigation: The Role of Reporter for a Law Project, 38 HASTINGS.
CONST. L.Q. 747, 794 (2011) (noting that defense counsel should generally refrain
from representing “two or more clients in criminal cases”).
57
That principle is not incompatible with the points made supra, Part VII. The
justification for coordination and cooperation among co-defendants and their counsel is to achieve the best results for the individual client. The preference for joint
defense strategy and communication merely recognizes that a unified approach is
most advantageous for each client.
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pardized obtaining the best results for the individual client. Indeed,
if, as David’s lawyers, we would have considered as a priority the
broader goal of invalidating the military commissions in their entirety, we would not have been able to capitalize on the opportunity for a
disposition that resulted in David’s return to Australia sixty days later
and his freedom within six months thereafter. If David had not
pleaded guilty, but instead waited for (another) defeat of the military
58
commission system, he would likely still be at Guantánamo Bay,
“presumed” innocent but still awaiting trial in the fifth incarnation of
59
a failed and illegitimate system.
In the criminal justice system, justice most often must be
achieved one defendant at a time, and deviating from that principle
often precludes both aims: the client gets convicted, and the cause is
not advanced, either. For Guantánamo Bay, too, the concept is the
same: it now appears, given President Obama’s unwillingness and/or
inability to shutter the facility, that the detention operation will only
be closed one detainee at a time, through individual cases in the military commissions and habeas petitions that gain a detainee’s release.
VIII. THE ADVANTAGES OF A GLOBAL AUDIENCE
The attention paid to Guantánamo Bay detainees by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international (and, over time,
domestic) media, organized bar associations, and academics in the
United States and abroad created an atmosphere conducive to pressuring the military commissions apparatus by appeals to those audiences. Because the purpose, structure, and operation of the military commissions were so transparently political, the commissions
were naturally quite sensitive to political pressure. Thus, media, academic, and NGO criticism of the military commissions exerted an
impact on the commissions far greater than would have been the case
in the federal courts, which, although not entirely immune to influence from those quarters, are far more insulated from it.
The global audience also provided the lawyers available outlets
for their message on a daily basis, as there was never a shortage of reporters, professors, and NGOs anxious for information about the
58
Although David’s case was still relatively early in its pretrial phase when the
Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006), the Court’s
rejection of the military commissions did not free David. All the ruling did was leave
David in continued limbo pending Congress’s attempt to gloss over the commissions’
inadequacies via the Military Commission Act of 2006.
59
In early 2011, there were “172 detainees remaining [in Guantánamo], 48 of
whom are expected to be held indefinitely.” Glenn Kessler, Takes Factchecker Banner
with GK Mug, WASH. POST, May 22, 2011, at A6.
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Guantánamo Bay detainees and their legal struggles in both the military commissions and habeas corpus process. Also, once the military
commissions commenced and their deficiencies were apparent, stinging editorials from U.S. newspapers placed the commissions on the
60
defensive. That posture only aggravated the problem for the commissions, as cosmetic changes or reforms were recognized as such
and further eroded the military commissions’ credibility.
Experience in high-profile cases in the U.S. courts obviously
provided defense lawyers excellent training for this aspect of the military commissions, although the scope and volume of the attention
vastly exceeded all but the highest profile cases—and with respect to
academic and NGO interest, it was unprecedented for criminal proceedings. While it is a myth that the media can be “controlled,” even
by the most skilled lawyer, experience does provide guidance on how
to maximize the advantages of media interest in a case for the client’s
benefit—steadfastly keeping in mind that the only objective is improving the client’s chances and not aggrandizement of the attorney’s media profile or reputation.
Criminal cases are rarely won by appealing to an audience outside the jury box or judge’s bench, but with respect to the Guantánamo Bay military commissions, the global audience and its enduring
fascination with all things Guantánamo created a fertile environment
for successfully challenging the military commissions and revealing its
many flaws.
IX. THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING THE RIGHT CLIENT
An additional advantage was not the result of federal court experience as a defense lawyer. Rather, it was simply good fortune to have
David as a client. The absence of a language barrier, the relative lack
of any cultural barrier (Australian cultural mores are close enough to
61
American, Vegimite and “football” aside), and the ability to engage
in regular contact with David’s family all combined to make establishing the essentials of a productive attorney-client relationship—trust,
62
confidence, and candor —a relatively effortless process.
60
61

See, e.g., Editorial, The President and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at A22.
Vegimite is a popular Australian dark brown food paste made from yeast ex-

tract.
62

While these three elements are all related, they are in fact different. Trust involves believing what the other person says and that person’s bona fides(in this instance, counsel acting in the best interest of the client, and the client’s agenda being
transparent). Confidence, on the other hand, involves the client listening to the lawyer’s advice and making prudent decisions based on the belief that such advice has
merit. Candor, in which lawyer and client provide their honest assessment of the

DRATEL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1358

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/16/2011 2:39 PM

[Vol. 41:1339

For many other lawyers, particularly military lawyers without the
aid of civilian counsel, the suspicion and distrust detainees harbored
with respect to uniformed U.S. officers was difficult to overcome and
created initial obstacles that we never encountered with David. Also,
without doubt, some of the advantages described above, particularly
the lack of any “competition” at the outset, enabled us to accomplish
certain objectives for David that increased his confidence in our ability to achieve our more important goals in the commissions themselves.
Throughout the period of representation, David was an engaged
and informed client, an avid student of both the system to which he
was subjected and other subjects—English literature, science, and
math, for example—that due to his lack of extensive formal education had not previously been accessible to him. He handled the challenging circumstances of his confinement and prosecution with great
resilience, perseverance, and humor, without which probably none of
the advantages discussed in this Essay would have mattered much at
all.
The point of this Essay is not to suggest that for experienced
federal practitioners these advantages make the military commissions
a venue superior to federal courts, but instead that those who practice in the federal courts and state a preference for federal court
prosecutions of Guantánamo Bay detainees (and apprehended alleged terrorists generally) do not do so because of some inability to
navigate the military commissions. Rather, it is based on the belief
that the federal courts constitute a legitimate system in which justice
is at least possible and the design of which is not merely to guarantee
convictions.
Indeed, proponents of military commissions who see them as a
barrel in which to prosecute alleged terrorist fish should be aware
that the fundamental defects in the military commissions provide
substantial opportunity for experienced civilian defense practitioners—which is perhaps why the government has thus far refused to
fund the participation of civilian defense counsel in the commissions.
As a Department of Justice (DoJ) lawyer reportedly declared during a
high-level internal DoJ strategy session shortly after September 11,
2001, regarding affording Muslim detainees in federal civilian custody timely access to counsel, “Let’s not make it so they can get Johnny

facts, the circumstances, and each other, stems from the foundation of both trust
and confidence. All three are imperative for an effective attorney-client relationship.
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63

Cochran on the phone.” While unfortunately Mr. Cochran is deceased, the spirit of vigorous, innovative, and intelligent defense lawyering lives on.

63

See STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 147
(2003).

